While all six have been viewed as corporate raiders, the most notorious raiding reputation undoubtedly belongs to Victor Posner. In fact, he "is rarely identified without the tag 'corporate raider",lQ/j moreover, "few businessmen have suffered more abuse in recent years than Victor Posner."ll/ To his numerous critics Posner has "all the talent of an accomplished raider: boldness, ferocity, tenacity and greed. He may not be a promising candidate for charitable work, but for the provision of loot his credentials are excellent.".!1/ Although such allegations are often levied against the six, there never is a precise definition of corporate raiding. One can, however, from news reports (and with a constructive imagination) outline several possible definitions of raiding, all having the common element of reducing the wealth of other stockholders. The most extreme form of raiding apparently centers around "looting" the corporate treasury.
For example, following Victor Posner's acquisition of stock in Foremost-McKesson, a lawsuit was filed against him alleging that his goal was "to prey upon and defraud stockholders of a carefully chosen series of corporations by means of a corruptly conceived and maliciously executed strategy of corporate warfare."il/ It was further alleged that Posner had "taken over and looted at least eight corporations in approximately as many years."l.!!..! Another perhaps less drastic definition of raiding is that the six use their corporate voting power to accord themselves "excessive" compensation and for both the firms the six were buying into ("target firms") as weIJ as the firms the six used to make those purchases ("filing firms"). No matter how corporate raiding might be defined, fundamentally it seems to imply that stock acquisitions by the raider ultimately reduce the wealth of other stockholders in target firms. The evidence uncovered by our inquiry, however, shows that on average Page 4 stockholders of target firms earned statistically significant positive abnormal returns when it was first announced that one of these six controversial investors had purchased stock. The second part of our inquiry was to follow the investors' activities in the target firms for the two years following their initial stock purchases. The evidence from this inquiry is likewise inconsistent with the hypothesis that the six have been corpora te raiders.
Thus, the empirical evidence from both parts of our inquiry is inconsistent with the raider image of the six investors. The empirical findings, on the other hand, fail to identify the precise role of the six. We do, however, discuss two hypotheses tha tare consistent with some if not all of the em pirical findings: first, that the six lrnprove the management of target firms; second, that the six consistently identify under priced stocks. acquisitions by "hidden" affilia tes.
From the initial sample of 155 13(d)'s gathered from the SEC News Digest (see Table I To compare the market's response to initial stockholding by any of the six with the market's response to initial stockholding by an "average" investor, we collected a random sample of 689 13(d)'s filed during 1977-1981. The random sample was generated by examining every tenth filing of an initial 13(d) as reported in the SEC News Digest. When that filing was by anyone other than one of the six investors (or by an affiliated company), it was included in the random sample, otherwise it was passed over. The sample used to measure the stock price changes of the random target firms has 155 observations. 24/ The final sample of random filing firms consists of 30 Page 7
observations. The data for both the six investors and the random sample are summarized in Table 1 .
( Table I goes 
where R it is the return to firm i at time t, R is the equal weighted return to the m t market portfolio at time t, u is an independent and identically distributed random it error term, and a., e. are the unknown parameters to be estimated. These two 1 1 parameters were estimated from a sample of approximately 200 trading days, from 300 days before the event (typically the filing of the l3(d)) through 100 days before the event. 26/ Using the estima ted a, and 8., predicted returns for firm i were then 1 1 generated for forty days before and after the event day. Abnormal returns were accordingly calculated as the difference between the actual and the predicted returns:
These abnormal returns were then averaged across events, that is, across the announcements of initial stock purchases, to form a portfolio abnormal return:
where n, which is constant over all days in the event period, is the number of observations (see Table 1 ). Finally, cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) were formed by summing the continuously compounded abnormal returns over the event period.
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The events being analyzed are the first public announcements of stockholding in a given target firm by any of the six investors. For the purposes of this study, day zero in event time (lle ve nt day") is defined as the earliest date on which an initial stock purchase (or a forthcoming purchase) was publidy revealed. In most instances this informa tion was revealed by the filing of a 13( Under the null hypothesis of zero abnormal returns, the ratio AR/S is t distributed with 80 degrees of freedom. The variance of the cumulative return was obtained by summing the sample variance of the abnormal returns over the number of days contained in the cumulative return; a similar procedure was followed for the two-day event day returns.
Target Firms' Stockholder Returns
Average daily abnormal returns (~ and cumulative average daily abnormal returns (CAR) to stockholders in target firms where any of the six investors filed an initial 13(d) are presented in Table II The most prominent finding in Table II is the positive abnormal return of 1.77% earned on average by stockholders in target firms on the day of and the day following the first public announcement of initial stockholding by one of the six investors. The t-statistics for selected periods from 40 days before to 40 days after the event day are also presented in Table II . The t-sta tistic for the event date is 3.7; the null hypothesis of a zero mean event day return can, therefore, be rejected at the .01 significance level. Interpretations of these and all empirical findings are delayed until Section IV. of stockholde rs, Accordingly, we measured the cumulative abnormal returns commencing forty days prior through forty days after the event day; we also measured the abnormal returns over the period from ten days before through the event day.
Both findings are reported in Table III and confirm that announcements of initial stock purchases by the six investors are on average associated with wealth increases for target firms' stockholders. Finally, it should be noted that the downward drift in stockholder returns from the event day through the end of the event period is sta tisticaJly insignificant.
( Table III goes about 5% of the variation in abnormal returns).
It should be noted, howe ver, that our data do not allow a strong test of the effect of block size on price, because the dates of the actual stock purchases do not have to be reported to the SEC. It is possible, indeed even likely, that a substantial part of any acquisition plan by one of the six investors would have transpired before our event period. In that case our data would reveal almost nothing about whether the increased demand put upward pressure on stock prices.
With respect to the comparison of the six with the random sample, we found that a random 13(d) is on average likewise associated with a statistically significant increase in the stock price of target firms. The increase on the event day, however, is smaller for the random sample than it is for the six (0.4% v, 1.8%). To test the hypothesis that these two abnormal returns were equal, a standard two-sample t-test was used. We treated the (two-day) announcement day returns as a set of independent drawings from populations that have equivalent variancesl..!/ and the same mean under the null hypothesis. The difference in means yielded a t-statistlc of 2.2, with a p value of .03. The announcement day returns therefore appear to be statistically distinguishable. Over the eighty-day event period, on the other hand, the CARis are statistically similar for both groups (6.7% for the six, 5.8% for the random sample), (See Figure 1 and Table III.) Finally, because the six investors do not act as a group, for each of the individual investors we conducted the same empirical investigations as we did for the six collectively. Highlights of those findings are in Table III . As reported there, we found no statistically significant negative returns for any of the investors during any of the three periods studied.
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1:. Filing Firms' Stockholder Returns
We also measured stock price changes for firms purchasing stock in other companies and thus filing a 13(d) (llfiling firms"). These returns, however, need to be interpreted with caution. To the extent that a filing firm has a reputation for acquiring stock in other companies, the expected value, be it negative or positive, of stock acquisitions to filing firms will be incorporated in the stock price when the acquisition program first becomes known by the market. 32/ New announcements of stock purchases will affect stock prices of filing firms only to the extent that it causes the market to revise its previous expectations. Jensen and Ruback (1983, p, 20) summarize additional difficulties in measuring returns to bidding firms involved in take-overs and mergers, difficulties that are also relevant for measuring returns to firms filing 13(d)'s. With these cautions in mind, returns to filing firms affiliated with one of the six investors are summarized in Table IV and plotted in Figure 3 . Although the event day returns for the six are strongly positive, the CAR's are slightly negative.
The downward drift in CAR's after the event date lacks statistical significance. Table   IV and Figure 3 also contain findings for the random sample of filing firms as a benchmark to e valua te the findings on the six investors.
( Table IV and 
1:. Summary of Activities in Target Firms
Activities of the six investors in the target firms for the two years following an initial 13(d) are summarized in Table V. ( Table V goes defined as: the day on which the target firm's board announced its approval of a reorganization (for the successful reorganization category); or the day on which the reorganization offer was publicly withdrawn (for unsuccessful reorganizations); or the day on which the target firm announced that it would repurchase the investor's shares (for repurchases).
To further investigate the effect of these follow-up activities by the six investors, we calculated a measure of the overall or "total" return to stockholders in target firms due to the controversial investor's stockholding. This is similar to the procedure Mikkelson and Ruback (1984) obtain an average firm effect. To find the overall effect of the investor's association with a given target firm, we again summed all events (that is, the initial event, all intermediate events, and the final event) to obtain the "total" return for a particular firm. These firm returns were then averaged across all firms to yield the "total"
average abnormal return associated with each of the three categories of outcomes (successful reorganization, unsuccessful reorganiza tions, and repurchase). We are now prepared to interpret the empirical evidence of Section III in light of three alternative, but not necessarily mutually inconsistent, hypotheses on the market role of the six investors. Briefly the three hypotheses are:
Raiding Hypothesis: The six investors purchase stock and then to the detriment of other stockholders "raid" target firms by transferring corporate assets to themselves.
Improved Management Hypothesis: The six help improve the management of target firms.
Superior Security Analyst Hypothesis: The six investors either possess non-public information on target firms or have skills at evaluating publicly-available information on those firms. In either event, the six are able to identify and then purchase under priced stocks.
B.
Raiding Hypothesis
As explained earlier, the most pre levant view (at least within the financial press) is that the six investors are corporate raiders who, in some unspecified manner, expropriate corporate assets to the detriment of other stockholders. Before testing this hypothesis against the empirical evidence in Section Ill, it should be noted that the raiding hypothesis in general is logicaJJy flawed. As Bradley (1980) explains, once it becomes possible that someone is attempting to acquire 51% of a target firm's stock in order to raid it (in theory, leaving the owners of the other 49% of the firm with worthless stock), other investors should start acquiring the stock in order to be the first to gain voting control and thus be the one who is able to raid the target. 34/ These entrants in the market for control wiJJ "bid up the price for 51% of the target to the market value of 100% of the firm's securities".35/ In other words, "competition in the market for corpora te control theoreticaJJy precludes corporate raiding strategies from 
D. Superior Security Analyst Hypothesis
The superior security analyst hypothesis holds that the six investors systematically purchase under-priced stocks. These stock purchases could be based either on non-public information about target firms possessed by the six or on skills the six have in interpreting publicly-available information about target firms.
The positive abnormal returns to stockholders in target firms associated with the first public announcements of stockholding by the six are consistent with either version of this hypothesis. Moreover, it is possible that some investors systematically possess more valuable non-public information than do others or have greater skills at interpreting publicly-available information on target firms. If the market is aware of this, then this hypothesis could explain the observed differences in initial stock price changes depending on the identity of the individual filing the 13(d).
Other em pir lcal findings reported in Section III, most notably the direct involvement of the six investors in management and the targeted repurchases of their shares, can not be explained by the superior security analyst hypothesis. The superior Page 23 security analyst hypothesis has relevance only for stock purchases and does not address follow-up activities in target firms. It should be noted, however, that the evidence on the follow-up activities is not inconsistent with the superior security analyst hypothesis. Indeed, it is possible given all of the empirical evidence reported in Section III that the improved management hypothesis and the superior security analyst hypothesis simultaneously explain the market roles of these six investors. In other words, these two hypotheses are not mutually inconsistent.
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V. CONCLUSION
The empirical evidence reported in this paper lends no support to the corporate raider image of Carl kahn, Irwin Jacobs, Carl Lindner, David Murdock, Victor Posner, and the late Charles Bluhdorn, To the contrary, the empirical evidence shows that announcements of initial stock purchases by these six investors were on average associated with statistically significant increases in the wealth of target firms' stockholders. Moreover, on average these increases, at least for the announcement day, exceeded the increases associated with initial stock purchases by random (typically less controversial) investors. The activities of the six in target firms after they file an initial J3(d) also provide no support for the raiding hypothesis. Even when the controversial investors' shares were ultimately repurchased by the target firm (so called "greenmail"), target firms' stockholders on average experienced statistically significant wealth increases when the investor's entire tenure from the initial stock purchase through the repurchase as a stockholder is examined.
While the em pirical evidence is inconsistent with raiding hypothesis, the precise market role of the six is less clear. One reasonable interpretation of the evidence is that the six investors are associated with management changes that increase the value of corporate assets. Although our investigation of the activities of the six in target firms sheds some light on these management changes, more research is needed to identify their precise nature, and to ascertain whether the investors helped cause these changes or whether they merely anticipated them. Additional research is also needed to answer what is arguably the biggest mystery uncovered by our investigations: Given that the six investors are on average associated with increases in the wealth of other stockholders, how did they ever obtain the label of corporate raider, and why has tha t label persisted?
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Footnotes
IIAlthough these investors do not act as a group, all six are studied here because they are often lumped together in the financial press as corporate raiders.
11Fortune, September 19, 1983, p. 160 (a former business partner describing Irwin Jacobs).
11Fortune, September 19, 1983, p. 164 (describing Irwin Jacobs) .
!il Forbes, October 29, 1979, p. 36 (describing Victor Posner) .
11Fortune, January 1977, p. 138 (describing Carl Lindner October 29, 1979, p, 34. .!.£IBarron's November 19, 1979, p• .5. ill Wall Street Journal, October 28, 1983, p. 6. IIISecurities are broadly defined in the regulations to include bonds and stocks (both voting and non-voting).
11/Forbes,
lJ/Subsequent 13(d)'s must be filed with each 2% increase in the holdings of any security. Unless otherwise specified, references in this paper to 13(d)'s are to initial filings.
201The computer searches were also used to double-check the SEC News Digest for announcements of 13(d) filings and to search for expressions of intent by any of the six investors to acquire securities.
n./ More precisely, target companies were eliminated when the CRSP file did not have 300 daily returns before the event date and 40 daily returns after the event date, which is typically the day when the 13(d) was filed at the SEC. For a more precise identification of the event date, see page 9. In addition, firms whose stock did not trade every day during the event period (40 days on each side of the event date) were also eliminated.
were a so e irrunate 0 owmg t e same crrterra use to 1 mg cornparues eliminate target companies. See note 21.
23/There are many observations for Posner because he often used multiple companies to buy stock in a single target firm. This was not true of the other investors.
24/For both the six investors and the random sample, we replicated the analysis after elimina ting all target firms mentioned for any reason in the Wall Street Journal from three days before to three days after the event day. Because the results from these reduced samples were similar to the results reported here, the findings from the reduced samples are not reported.
251For an overview of event study methodology, see Brown and Warner (I 985); Schwert (I 981).
26/ The actual number of observations in the estimation period varies from 201 to 189 due to the lack of trading of certain securities on some days. If a security did not trade on a particular day, that day was simply passed over for both R and R it mt.
271Filing dates are published in the SEC News Digest shortly after the filing.
281Neither of these news services appears to cover 13(d) filings systematically. For example, most of the filings by the six investors were covered while few of the random sample of filings were reported .
• Page 28 29/ An alternative approach would be to exclude the day being tested from the calculation of the variance of the event period excess returns. If there are variance increasing events occuring during the event period, such a procedure would tend to decrease the estima ted variance, leading to larger t-sta tistics.
30/For more detailed discussions of this issue, see Scholes (1972) ; Mikkelson and Partch (1985) ; Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers (1984) .
11/An F-test on the variances could not reject the hypothesis of equality.
32/See Malatesta (l983) ; Schipper &. Thompson (l983) .
33/The only difference with the earlier event study of the initial announcements of stockholding is that here firms were not eliminated from the sample if they did not trade on all days during the event period. Instead, all available returns were used and the denominator used in the averaging was adjusted according to how many firms were used to form the average for that particular day.
34/Crucial to this argument is that parties must publicly notify the SEC pursuant to regulation 13(d). (1980) Harris &. Risk (1983); Madden (1981) .
35/Bradley
!!l/While there are negative returns for some target firms, overall these negative returns are out-weighed by the positive returns for other target firms. Table VI , announcements of repurchases were associated with returns of -1.3%, t = -1.5. Equivalent results on the announcement of repurchases from other more general studies are as follows: Dann and DeAngelo (1983) (-1.8%, t = -3.6); Bradley and Wakeman (1983) (-1.2%, t = -3.3); Mikkelson and Ruback (l984) (-J.no (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) and for
42/As reported in
The Random Sample (n =I") (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) . , , , , , . .
.. ,
..
---...... (n =99) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) and for the Random Sample (n =l.n) .
DISTRIBUTION or [VENT DAY RETURNS
._t,... '.110 . . Both the Six Investors (n =99) and for the Random Sample (n = 1lS) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) .,. ------------------------------------------------------.----------------------------------- , , , ,
--~~-----------------T----------------------------
, " , , . £!This means tha t for a target firm there were no repurchases of the investors' shares, no attempts to reorganize, no news reports of management by the investor, and no amended 13(d)'s filed. 
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